Sengcan

Object of evaluation in this archive

The text of the Xinxin ming traditionally attributed to Sengcan; for the historical Sengcan himself there is not enough reliable doctrinal material for a six-position position.

Main texts

Xinxin ming (the version in fascicle 30 of the Jingde chuandeng lu; the separate text, Taishō T48 No.2010); the relevant records in Daoxuan’s Xu gaoseng zhuan

Core-text marks

See Part 16 (all are original lines of the Xinxin ming, not confirmable words of Sengcan himself)

The first question this archive must answer is not “which position Sengcan belongs to” but “what exactly are we evaluating”.

The extant material must be divided into at least five layers. 1. The historical Sengcan: Daoxuan’s Xu gaoseng zhuan, “Biography of Fachong”, records a “Chan master Can” in the list of Huike’s lineage, with a bracketed note that this group “spoke the profound principle orally and did not produce written records” (E-01, checked against the current canonical transcription).

The Xu gaoseng zhuan also has records of a “Chan master Sengcan”, but whether this is the same historical person remains to be examined, and similar names cannot simply be merged. The reliable material available cannot reconstruct his complete doctrinal system. 2. The early image of Sengcan’s lineage: the Lengqie shizi ji and others in the early eighth century expand the narrative of reclusion and transmission to Daoxin (E-03); in it the early basis cited with “according to the Xu gaoseng zhuan” is mainly the lineage list, and the rest of the narrative cannot pass as Daoxuan’s own words. 3. The later image of the third patriarch: stelae, lamp histories, gong’an and posthumous titles make up a history of transmission and reception, whose attribution evidence is checked separately. 4. The text of the Xinxin ming: extant as included in fascicle 30 of the Jingde chuandeng lu under the heading “third patriarch, Great Master Sengcan”; its earlier circulation and specific authorship still need to be traced. 5. The later history of reception: including the reinterpretations of the inscription by Zhaozhou, Xuedou and others in the Chan school. The archive takes only the text of layer 4 as the direct object of thought for the six positions and the deletion test.

This archive makes a strict restriction of object: the six positions, the last load-bearing points and the deletion test analyse “the text of the Xinxin ming traditionally attributed to Sengcan”, and do not thereby claim that the historical Sengcan actually wrote this text or held every claim in it. The confirmable doctrinal material for the historical Sengcan is insufficient, so no six-position position is given for now; insufficient material is not ③ “Inquiry into the Ground”.

The Xinxin ming is currently placed at ② “Direct Seeing of the Ground”, with the ① / ② boundary open (C): neither condition for ① is passed; under the rule that reasonable ambiguity between ① and ② is resolved as ②, it is currently placed at ②, but the necessary completion condition of ② is still not raised to B. E-07, “not recognising the profound purport, one labours in vain at stilling thought”, explicitly stipulates that seeking stillness without recognising the profound purport is in vain, which is a strong positive proof of ② as a condition of practice; but it does not state that every possible ultimate completion must first pass through a non-deletable act of correct cognition. E-10 “a moment of turning the light back” and E-16 “right faith is straight” add completing possibilities on the ② side. On the other side, E-10 “there is no need to seek the true;

2.2 Distinguishing four objects of evaluation

2.3 Authorship of the Xinxin ming

Limits of the attribution evidence: 1. Daoxuan’s Xu gaoseng zhuan, “Biography of Fachong”, lists “after Chan master Ke, Chan master Can …” and “all the above spoke the profound principle orally and did not produce written records” (E-01), but “no written record was registered at the time” does not prove that he never wrote anything in his life. 2. The statement in the Lengqie shizi ji about “not producing written records” partly inherits Daoxuan and cannot be treated as a fully independent second piece of negative evidence (E-03). 3. The silence of early Tang histories has some restricting force, but does not exhaust all Tang material. 4. Fascicle 30 of the Jingde chuandeng lu (c.

1004) provides the Song signature “Xinxin ming of the third patriarch, Great Master Sengcan” that can at present be checked directly (E-20). Yinshun’s History of Chinese Chan further points out that the Baizhang guanglu already attributes the Xinxin ming to Sengcan; the specific passage of this extant document, the date of its transmitted version, and whether it can be confirmed as a Tang record still need to be checked against the actual editions, and 1004 can no longer be called the absolutely earliest signature. 5. The naming relation between Farong’s Xin ming and the Xinxin ming in the Zongjing lu must also be collated place by place. Authorship remains unproven and is not automatically changed by earlier legends of attribution.

Evidence that may support “an intellectual connection with the Huike–Sengcan lineage” - Huike’s reply to the layman Xiang (T2, E-02) already has non-dual language such as “ignorance and wisdom are equal and not different; know that the myriad dharmas are all thus. Pitying those who hold the two views …”. This shows that the thought of “the two views / the myriad dharmas all thus” already existed in Huike’s lineage in the late sixth century, so the themes of the Xinxin ming are not foreign to that lineage; but this cannot prove that the Xinxin ming came from Sengcan’s hand.

Current grades of attribution and date: ① “the Xinxin ming was written by the historical Sengcan himself”: D (the traditional signature, not yet supported by early direct evidence, and not to be written up as disproved); ② “a Xinxin ming signed as Sengcan’s is already found in fascicle 30 of the Jingde chuandeng lu”: A (fact of the textual signature); ③ “formed in the Tang and later attributed to Sengcan”: C (supported by scholarly interpretation, but the earliest extant checkable Song version and early silence alone are not enough to raise it directly to B; the chain of early citations still needs checking); ④ “related to Huike’s lineage and the Oxhead Xin ming”: C (each to be verified separately). Accordingly this archive does not use the Xinxin ming directly as evidence of the complete thought structure of the historical Sengcan.

2.4 Versions

Base of versions: this archive uses the version in fascicle 30 of the Jingde chuandeng lu as the base for quotation, and must at the same time list the key variants of the separate text T48 No.2010, without presupposing any proven priority between the two. In E-17 the former reads “empty brightness illuminates itself”, the latter “empty brightness is natural”;

The tension between steps 3, 7 and 13 on the one hand and the second half of step 7, steps 14 and 16 on the other is the most delicate point of this archive (Part 9): “recognising the profound purport / turning the light back / right faith” versus “no need to seek the true / no exertion of mind / the believing mind is not two”.

3.3 Features of the text’s composition

Each time the Xinxin ming puts forward a remedy, it at once withdraws the remedy itself: having said “do not chase conditioned things” it immediately adds “do not dwell in the acceptance of emptiness”; having said “stopping motion to return to stillness” it immediately points out that “stopping makes for still more motion”; having said “two exists because of one” it immediately adds “do not keep even the one”;

4.2 T3｜Early Chan histories of the early eighth century

For the entry on Sengcan in Du Fei’s Chuan fabao ji this archive has not obtained a reliable transcription, so no evidence number is assigned; whether it mentions any writings must be checked externally.

4.3 T4｜Later constructions

4.4 Text of the Xinxin ming (attribution axis T4 / textual axis: main text of this archive)

4.5 Side-evidence and history of reception (T4)

4.6 Summary of the evidence base

• Group B: “there is no need to seek the true; one need only cease views” (E-10), “using the mind to work on the mind — is that not a great error?” (E-14), “empty brightness illuminates itself / is natural, with no exertion of mind” (T51 / T48) (E-17), “the believing mind is not two; not two is the believing mind” (E-19).

The question is: is the “recognising / illuminating / faith” of Group A a non-deletable condition of completion in the turn from picking and choosing to non-duality (②), or merely another way of saying Group B’s “ceasing views” and “self-illumination”, which can be absorbed in the structure of completion without leaving an independent function (①)?

The textual situation: 1. “Not recognising the profound purport, one labours in vain at stilling thought” grammatically links “not recognising” explicitly with “stilling thought is in vain”, so the evidence for ② is fairly strong on the point of a practice condition (B), but it has not been proved to be the only route to all ultimate completion. 2. “There is no need to seek the true; one need only cease views” rejects objectifying search for the true, and “using the mind on the mind” rejects self-manipulation as a method; they offer a candidate reading in which the cognitive condition can be deleted, but do not actually prove that deletion passes. 3.

7.2 Special analysis of the ① / ② boundary

Note on the six-position boundary: the ② side takes E-07, “not recognising the profound purport, one labours in vain at stilling thought”, as a fairly strong positive proof of a practice condition, with E-10 and E-16 as possible supporting evidence of completion; the candidate evidence on the ① side consists mainly of removing picking and choosing, ceasing views, the criticism of “using the mind to work on the mind”, and T51’s “empty brightness illuminates itself”, a mode of completion that has a substantive variant and does not directly constitute a genesis. E-12’s mutual dependence of subject and object and E-19’s “the believing mind is not two” cannot serve as undisputed proof of “positive embedding of cognition” either. The weight on the two sides is not symmetrical and leans toward ②;

but the necessity in E-07 has not been proved to apply to every mode of ultimate completion, so the condition of classification remains C; ② (B) is not assigned on this basis, still less ①.

Key checks: 1. ① positive embedding? There is no direct proof that is stable across versions and clearly structural; T51’s “illuminates itself” offers only a weak candidate, and E-12 / E-19 are not clear proofs of genesis — not passed. 2. ① passing deletion? “No need to seek the true” only rejects objectifying search for the true, and “ceasing views” may still involve discerning mistaken views; it does not prove that correct comprehension as a condition of completion has been deleted. 3. ② necessary cognition? E-07 proves that stilling thought without understanding the profound purport is necessarily in vain (practice condition B); whether this can be generalised into a necessary link of the complete ultimate structure is C. 4. T51 / T48: parallel witnesses of version; the weight of the base text is not decided by “which version favours which position”; which is earlier or more original is unproven.

The six-position framework stipulates: “If reasonable ambiguity remains between ① and ②, and it cannot be clearly proved that the cognitive function can already be deleted, one must not classify under ① on weaker evidence.” Accordingly it cannot be placed at ①.

The six-position framework also stipulates that “when the evidence for ① and ② is in balance, the ① / ② boundary dispute should be kept, rather than defaulting to ③”.

7.3 Current candidate position

• Object D: the text of the Xinxin ming — currently placed at ② “Direct Seeing of the Ground”, with the ① / ② boundary open (C); the complete completion relation of ② remains C.

• Object A, the historical Sengcan: insufficient doctrinal material, no six-position position (not ③).

• Objects B / C: image history, no position.

Rule for the six-position ruling: ① must prove both positive embedding and passing deletion, and at present neither reaches the threshold for formal classification under ①. ② has fairly strong positive proof, but proving that “correct knowing is non-deletable in complete ultimate fulfilment” requires more than proving that “a certain practice of seeking stillness through thought is in vain without recognition”. The six-position framework stipulates that when reasonable ambiguity remains between ① and ② and it cannot be clearly proven that the cognitive function can be deleted, the thought is placed at ②, and the burden of proof for ① is higher. Accordingly it is currently placed at ②, with the ① / ② boundary open (C);

• For Bodhidharma, ①’s condition 1 has no evidence; the Xinxin ming has a weaker candidate reading for ①, but the key variant and the structural interpretation are unresolved. Bodhidharma has the ethical return of the four practices; the Xinxin ming has none.

• Comparison of title words: in Bodhidharma’s “deeply believing that all living beings share one and the same true nature”, faith is an acknowledgment of the true nature; in the Xinxin ming’s “the believing mind is not two; not two is the believing mind”, the believing mind and not-two are mutually identical — a candidate difference between the two at the ① / ② boundary worth testing, not an established proof.

No.03 Huineng (conclusion of the existing archive: ② B)

• Same: both reject practices of watching purity and stilling (the Xinxin ming’s “labours in vain at stilling thought”, “stopping makes for still more motion”).

• Different: Huineng takes “seeing the nature” as the entrance standard and relation of completion, and “in thought, not thinking” rejects cutting off thought; the Xinxin ming says “there is no need to seek the true; one need only cease views” and “cut off words and thoughts”, with weaker cognitive language and a stronger tone of cessation.

• Huineng constrains the objectification of seeing the nature with “not abiding”; the Xinxin ming withdraws “one” with “do not keep even the one”.

• Guarding against back-projection: Huineng’s “seeing the nature” cannot be used to supply a cognitive condition of completion for the Xinxin ming; nor can the later standing of the Xinxin ming as Chan orthodoxy be used to infer that its structure agrees with Huineng’s.

No.02 Nāgārjuna (conclusion of the existing archive: ②)

• Same: “two exists because of one; do not keep even the one” and “being is non-being; non-being is being” are close in reflexive direction to the emptiness of emptiness and the interpenetration of emptiness and existence.

• Different: Nāgārjuna has the distinction of the two truths and rigorous argument; the Xinxin ming has direct interpenetration without the hierarchical distinction of the two truths, proclaimed in the inscription form rather than argued. - Nāgārjuna’s two truths are not used to supply argument for the Xinxin ming.

No.01 the Buddha (conclusion of the existing archive: ②)

• Different: the Buddha takes knowing and seeing the four noble truths as they are / realising them as the relation of completion;

• the Xinxin ming says explicitly “there is no need to seek the true”. This difference is a textual-structural contrast awaiting verification, not a cross-archive ranking of strength.

Comparative hypotheses awaiting verification

picking and choosing is the only obstacle; one does not pick and choose — without forming a new picking and choosing — by the even mind, letting go and ceasing views. Whether “recognising the profound purport / right faith” also cannot be deleted cannot be decided (C).

Third, what is the most delicate relation of completion in this archive? “Not recognising the profound purport, one labours in vain at stilling thought” establishes a cognitive condition for a particular practice, but has not proved that all complete ultimate fulfilment must pass through a further independent correct cognition; “no need to seek the true” and “using the mind on the mind” in turn restrict objectifying search for the true, but do not prove that knowing and seeing have been deleted. The variant between T51’s “empty brightness illuminates itself” and T48’s “empty brightness is natural” makes the positive-embedding interpretation for ① even less stable. At present the double condition for ① is not passed, the ultimate load-bearing of ② remains C; under the ambiguity rule it is currently placed at ②, with the ① / ② boundary open.

On the object: the judgments above apply only to the extant text of the Xinxin ming traditionally attributed to Sengcan. Daoxuan’s separate record of the lineage list of Chan master Can and of his not producing written records cannot yet reconstruct the thought of the historical Sengcan;

14.2 Modern scholarship (not evidence in the main text)

• Xia Jinhua, “Sengcan zunian, jianta yu Xinxin ming de ruogan wenti kaolun”, Shilin 2020, no. 5 (abstract checked).

• Ishino Mikimasa, “Gozu Hōyū den no saikentō” (Nagoya University institutional repository, abstract checked).

• Yanagida Seizan, Shoki zenshū shisho no kenkyū (1967).

• Studies on the relation of the Xinxin ming to Buddhism of the Jiangdong region and to the Oxhead Xin ming (catalogue entry in the National Taiwan University Digital Library of Buddhist Studies;

• author and journal to be supplemented).

• John R. McRae, The Northern School and the Formation of Early Ch’an Buddhism (1986); Seeing through Zen (2003).

14.3 Questions for external checking

1. The core wording of the list in the Xu gaoseng zhuan, “Biography of Fachong”, has been checked against the current transcription of T50 No.2060; the edition used, the fascicle of the appended section and the page-column numbers should still be fixed, to avoid mixing different fascicle systems.

2. The key wording of the entry on Chan master Can in the Lengqie shizi ji has been checked against the current transcription of T85 No.2837; it remains to be clarified which parts quote the Xu gaoseng zhuan and which are Jingjue’s extended narrative.

3. Whether the entries on Sengcan in the Chuan fabao ji and the Lidai fabao ji mention any writings.

4. Whether a copy of the Xinxin ming exists among the Dunhuang manuscripts; whether the earliest pre-Song citations (Yanshou’s Zongjing lu, etc.) sign it as Sengcan’s.

5. Key variants checked: T51 fasc.

5. 30 “empty brightness illuminates itself” and T48 No.2010 “empty brightness is natural”; variants such as 契心 / 啟心 and 眼若不睡 / 不眠 should also be distinguished by transmitted version and not quoted indiscriminately. On authorship, Yinshun’s History of Chinese Chan points out that the Baizhang guanglu carries a tradition of attribution to Sengcan earlier than the Jingde chuandeng lu; this document has withdrawn the absolute claim of “1004 as the earliest signature”. Since the specific early transmitted text of that passage in the Baizhang guanglu has not yet been checked, it is not claimed directly that the extant original goes back to the Tang. If earlier reliable signatures, unsigned citations or new manuscripts appear in future, “historical authorship” and “textual scope” should be re-examined first; the six-position structural judgment should be reopened only if the wording of the philosophical base text and the scope of argument change substantively.

6. The original texts of the steles of Dugu Ji and Fang Guan; Xia Jinhua’s argument on the date of the posthumous title.

7. Transcription of the opening of the Xin ming.

8. The claim of death in the twelfth year of Kaihuang recorded on a brick inscription excavated in Hangzhou in 1982 (according to the abstract of Xia’s article).